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MASSACHUSETTS SECURITIES REGULATION: IN 
SEARCH OF THE FULCRUM 
Stephen M. Honigt 
The Massachusetts Securities Division and representatives of the 
Massachusetts Securities Bar are currently reevaluating Massa-
chusetts blue sky regulation. In this article, the author reviews 
the existing practices, and concludes that the Division has 
waivered between adopting a merit review or disclosure ap-
proach to regulation o.f registered and exempt offerings. The 
author concludes that vigorous merit review is unjust!fied under 
the Massachusetts statute, and advocates fundamental riform of 
existing practices to ensure certainty in regulation and national 
uniformity. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Massachusetts securities regulation currently reflects, in a micro-
cosm, competing extremes of regulatory philosophy. At present, it is 
unclear whether Massachusetts is a disclosure jurisdiction, a merit re-
view jurisdiction, 1 or a jurisdiction insistent on applying sui generis 
standards of review. The competition between disclosure and merit re-
view has left practitioners confused, and has given the commonwealth 
a reputation for unpredictability. Until the dominant regulatory ful-
crum is identified, the confusion and unpredictability is likely to 
continue. 
This article identifies and evaluates the regulatory bases, current 
practices, and possible trends in Massachusetts regulation of both regis-
tered and exempt offerings of securities. Accordingly, this article will 
not survey all aspects of Massachusetts securities regulation, but will 
concentrate on the philosophical and practical problems with Massa-
chusetts regulation of these important types of offerings. 
The article provides some essential background to this discussion 
by explaining how recent changes in the organization and staffing of 
the Massachusetts Securities Division (Division) have influenced the 
present form of regulation.2 The current pattern of Massachusetts reg-
t A.B., Columbia College, 1963; L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1966; Member, 
American Bar Association; Boston Bar Association (Securities Section); Massa-
chusetts Bar Association (Securities Section). The author's professional corpora-
tion is a partner in the law firm of Goldstein & Manello, Boston, Mass. The 
author acknowledges the substantial assistance of Peter Litman, Esq., and the re-
search efforts of John Ottaviani, Esq. 
1. Merit review of securities offerings requires the state securities administrator to 
determine whether the substantive terms of the offering are "fair, just, and equita-
ble" to the investor. If the offering fails to meet the standards of substantive fair-
ness, the administrator may deny registration, even if the prospectus adequately 
discloses all material information. For a defense of merit regulation, see Tyler, 
More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1982). 
2. See infra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. 
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ulation of registered public offerings, as well as some current proposals 
for reform, are discussed.3 In addition, the article describes the Massa-
chusetts treatment of exempt offerings, identifies some serious legal and 
practical problems, and discusses proposed changes in this area.4 The 
article concludes that fundamental reform of both the philosophy and 
practice of Massachusetts securities regulation is needed. 
These discussions could not come at a more difficult time in the 
history of Massachusetts securities regulation. This article will serve 
more as a historical benchmark than a long term guide to Massachu-
setts practice, because significant changes concerning the philosophical 
and technical underpinnings of the regulatory scheme are imminent. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The flavor of Massachusetts practice cannot be appreciated with-
out a historical perspective. At least in the memory of active practi-
tioners, the 1932 Massachusetts blue sky law5 presented a relaxed and 
uneventful regulatory context throughout its forty year existence. The 
Division enforced this law in a manner consistent with a disclosure phi-
losophy. Although it was frequently difficult to find a Massachusetts 
exemption applicable to federally exempt private placements,6 it was 
often possible to negotiate a discretionary exemption or to register on a 
disclosure basis. 
Even after the 1972 adoption of the Massachusetts Uniform Secur-
ities Act (Massachusetts Act),? a slightly modified version of the Uni-
form Securities Act (Uniform Act),8 Massachusetts practice did not 
vary greatly. The early years of the enforcement of the Massachusetts 
Act seldom gave rise to debates over the nature of merit review, or the 
propriety of particular regulations in light of a presumed philosophy of 
disclosure regulation. The Division did not undertake extensive sub-
stantive review of publicly or privately offered issues, and it was not 
difficult to obtain administrative expansion of the statutorily available 
exemptions. Although many of the restrictions on cheap stock that ap-
pear in the present Massachusetts regulations9 were first applied by the 
Division in 1973,10 practitioners at least initially found that the Divi-
3. See infra notes II-56 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 56-147 and accompanying text. 
5. 1932 Mass. Acts ch. 290, §§ 1-21 (repealed 1972). 
6. Indeed, the principal limited offering exemption was measured only in terms of 25 
or less shareholders at the offering's conclusion, but was only available to corpora-
tions organized within Massachusetts. Id. § 3(f). 
7. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, §§ 101-417 (West Supp. 1983). 
8. VNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 101-419, 7A V.L.A. 567-707 (1958), reprinted in I BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~~ 5501-5573 (1983). 
9. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305 (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 31,465 (1983). For a discussion of cheap or insider stock, see infra text 
accompanying notes 22-35. 
10. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, §§ 10.00-14.00 (1978) (proposed May 17, 1973). 
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sion was willing to make reasonable accommodation upon request of 
counsel if adequate disclosure had been made. 
After the 1972 reassignment of the Division from the Department 
of Public Utilities to the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
and the 1979 appointment of Michael Unger as Director of the Divi-
sion, however, Massachusetts practice was radically altered. As this ar-
ticle will demonstrate, a consumer protection orientation expressed 
through rigorous merit regulation replaced the disclosure philosophy, 
and, to the surprise of both the Massachusetts securities bar and out of 
state practitioners, the Massachusetts Act came to be enforced as a 
merit review statute for both public and private offerings. At present 
the merit review philosophy seems firmly entrenched. Although both 
the organized bar and a series of formal committees established by the 
Secretary of State are working toward greater clarity and predictability 
in the regulatory scheme, some element of merit review clearly will 
continue to be a hallmark of Massachusetts securities regulation. The 
precise degree to which merit review standards will prevail is a matter 
of current debate, and practitioners reading this article should take 
great care to update its contents. 
III. MASSACHUSETTS REGULATION OF PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS 
A. The Regulatory Context 
The Massachusetts Act makes it unlawful to offer or sell any secur-
ity in the commonwealth, unless the security is registered in accordance 
with the Act's provisions or the security or transaction in which it is 
issued is exempt from registration. II Registration may be obtained by 
coordination with a filing under the Securities Act of 193312 or by 
qualification. 13 
Until the Division clarifies its policies, counsel should assume that 
Massachusetts is a full merit review state. Although a detailed review 
may not be applied in every case, the assumption will avoid unfortu-
nate surprises. The purported statutory bases for merit review appear 
in section 305 of the Massachusetts Act.14 Under this section, the Sec-
retary may issue a stop order denying, suspending, or revoking effec-
tiveness of an offering if: (1) "the offering has worked or tended to 
work a fraud upon purchasers or would so operate;"15 or (2) the offer-
ing involves "unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' dis-
counts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or 
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 301 (West Supp. 1983). 
12. /d. § 302; see Securities Act of 1933 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1982). 
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 303 (West Supp. 1983). 
14. /d. § 305. 
15. /d. § 305(a)(E). 
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participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options." 16 
The Massachusetts regulations (regulations) contain the formal ar-
ticulation of substantive standards derived from these general statutory 
provisions. Specifically, the regulations provide that unless an issuer 
has been in business for two years it may not use more than ten percent 
of the net proceeds to repay loans made by promoters, finders, control-
ling stockholders, officers, or directors. 17 No offering, whether by coor-
dination or qualification, may result in the book value of common 
stock being less than twenty percent of its public offering price. 18 In 
addition, the regulations provide that an offering involves unreasonable 
underwriter and promoter profits if the aggregate of underwriter dis-
counts, commissions, profits, participations, options, or other consider-
ation exceeds eighteen percent of the aggregate amount of the public 
offering actually sold. 19 
Finally, the regulations provide that, for corporate issuers, a public 
offering of equity securities will be deemed to work a fraud upon pur-
chasers when it is preceded by the issuance of "an unreasonable 
amount of promotional or cheap stock."20 The regulations include pro-
visions defining "promotional or cheap stock"21 and establish several 
safe harbors useful for avoiding insider stock problems. Strict compli-
ance with these regulations, however, does not necessarily satisfy Mas-
sachusetts merit review.22 The Division today neither systematically 
takes action against transactions that violate the provisions, nor consist-
ently clears transactions that comply. Despite this inconsistent prac-
tice, the detailed insider stock provisions are instructive and deserve 
closer examination. 
The regulations define promotional or cheap stock (insider stock) 
to include any equity security issued or sold within eighteen months of 
the public offering date to underwriters and various insiders at a price 
16. ld § 305(a)(F). There are four other instances in which the Secretary may revoke 
an offering. See id § 305(a)(A)-(D). 
17. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.303(b)(9) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 31,463 (1982). 
18. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.304(c) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 31,464 (1982). Commentators have indicated that this and the prior 
provision, "because of the regulatory headings under which they fall and because 
they would otherwise conflict with the statutory scheme, should be interpreted as 
conditions to effectiveness of registration statements .... " J. SMITH & Z. 
CAVITCH, MASSACHUSETTS CORPORATION LAW 14-34 (1982). In any event, there 
is no clear statutory basis under § 304(c) of the Massachusetts Act or elsewhere for 
this blanket requirement. 
19. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(F) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982). Warrants to purchase the security are valued only 
to the extent that their exercise price is below the offering price. ld 
20. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982). 
21. ld These equity securities will be referred to as "cheap stock" or "insider stock" 
throughout this article. 
22. See infra section III B. 
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lower than and not reasonably related to the public offering price?3 In 
measuring the reasonableness of price, the following factors are consid-
ered: (1) the nature of restrictions on transfer; (2) the existence of con-
tractual provisions that could cause divestiture of the securities; (3) the 
extent to which the risk undertaken in the investment is substantially 
greater than the risk undertaken at the time of the public offering; and 
(4) with respect to securities issued for consideration other than cash, 
the opinion of an independent appraiser.24 
In addition to defining insider stock, the regulations establish four 
safe harbors to avoid insider stock problems: (1) for issuers organized 
within eighteen months of offering and in the promotional stage, in-
sider stock issued early in the history of the issuer, that either does not 
exceed twenty-five percent of the stock outstanding or is common stock 
with an average consideration per share equal to at least two-thirds of 
the public offering price;25 (2) for issuers organized more than eighteen 
months prior to the public offering date and not in the promotional 
stage, insider stock that does not exceed ten percent of the shares to be 
outstanding; (3) when the proposed offering price of an equity security 
does not exceed twenty-five times the net earnings per share; or 
(4) when arrangements have been made for escrow of insider stock for 
a period of one year or longer. 26 
Those contemplating offerings in Massachusetts should note one 
further source of "law" concerning public offerings. During 1980 and 
1981, and until a lack of funds and time caused its termination, the 
Division published a series of "Massachusetts Securities Bulletins" that 
gave practitioners some guidance as to the Division's policy and prac-
tice. Although criticized as constituting the issuance of regulations 
without compliance with statutory procedures,27 the bulletins nonethe-
less explained the Division's approach. An explanation in one of the 
bulletins of the Division's approach to insider stock problems deserves 
detailed description. 
The second bulletin issued by the Division made clear that compli-
ance with the terms of the four insider stock safe harbors would not 
foreclose further inquiry by the Division.28 Rather, the Division will 
look at all the circumstances of an offering to be reasonably certain that 
23. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982). 
24. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(i) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE 
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982). 
25. Options qualified under section 422 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 
U.S.c. § 422 (1982), and options exercisable in excess of 90% of the public offer-
ing price, are excluded. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(ii)(a) 
(1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982). 
26. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(ii)(b)-(d) (1978), reprinted in IA 
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982). 
27. The formal requisites of rulemaking appear in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, 
§§ 1-7 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983). 
28. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 1-2 (Oct. 1980). 
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the offering will not work a fraud. 29 If the Division determines that an 
offering will work a fraud, it may require that certain remedial actions 
be taken as a condition of registration. These actions could include a 
restructuring of the transaction, a capitalization of insider debt, or the 
escrow of insider stock. 30 Although the regulation refers to escrows 
running "one year or longer,"31 the Division made clear in this bulletin 
its interpretation of "longer": escrows with a minimum duration of 
eighteen months, running as long as five years, with insider stock to be 
released from escrow only if certain earnings requirements are met.32 
The bulletin further suggested that in appropriate cases, public shares 
would be given a liquidating preference over insider stock.33 
Finally, the bulletin noted that the definition of promotional or 
cheap stock provided in the regulations "is not all encompassing and 
does not attempt to define every type of cheap or promotional stock," 
and that "[i]n a number of cases, the Division has determined that pre-
viously issued shares should be treated as promotional or cheap stock 
even though the specific facts do not fall within the definition."34 The 
bulletin offered an example of this phenomenon: stock issued more 
than eighteen months prior to the public offering date, but without an 
intervening change in the affairs of the company so as to justify an 
increase in price, could constitute insider stoCk.35 Presumably the Divi-
sion will determine when intervening changes justify any increase in 
the price of the shares from the original issuance price. 
B. Current Public Offering Practices: Does the Massachusetts Act 
Permit "Fair and Equitable" Review? 
The discussion above should confirm the general impression held 
by Massachusetts securities practitioners that the Division practices an 
aggressive form of merit regulation. Indeed, Massachusetts is one of 
the twenty-seven members of the National Association of Securities 
Administrators Association..(NASAA) Merit Regulation Committee. 
In a recent survey36 the Division not only identified Massachusetts as a 
merit review state,37 but also answered affirmatively that it uses a "fair 
and equitable test or its equivalent," maintaining that the statutory 
29.ld at 16. 
30. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No. I, at 16 (July 1980). 
31. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(ii)( d) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE 
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (1982). 
32. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 17 (Oct. 1980). The earnings 
requirement is, generally, a five percent return on the offering price. The "stan-
dard" escrow agreement given by the Division to unwary counsel has, as recently 
as late 1983, called for a five year escrow. 
33. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 17 (Oct. 1980). 
34.ld at 16. 
35.ld 
36. Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Im-
portance lor an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689 (1982). 
37. Id at 803-05. 
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standard authorizing the Division to deny registration to offerings that 
work or tend to work a fraud38 was the equivalent of a "fair and equita-
ble" test. 39 
The assumption that the Massachusetts statute and its "work a 
fraud" language authorizes the use of a "fair and equitable" merit re-
view is highly suspect. The statutory language is taken from section 
306(a)(E) of the Uniform Act.40 The official comment to that section 
states that "this clause is not designed to be as broad as the 'sound 
business principles' standard or the 'fair, just, and equitable' standard 
found in some statutes."41 Further, the draftsman's commentary to 
that section made clear that: 
[c]lause (E) is not meant to be as broad as the old "fair, just, 
and equitable" standard in California. Somewhere between 
the narrow limitation of common law deceit and the opposite 
extreme of permitting the Administrator to substitute hIS busi-
ness judgment for the registrant's, a degree of flexibility seems 
to be essential. 42 
The Division's approach to "work a fraud" as the basis for a broad 
merit review is inconsistent with both the official and draftsman's com-
mentary to the Uniform Act, and the view of commentators that the 
work a fraud standard represents the narrowest of possible statutory 
bases for merit review.43 It is quite ironic that a merit standard, origi-
nally derived from Populist economic theory in the western and south-
ern states as a defense against the invasion of eastern interests,44 should 
be flourishing in Massachusetts, a state that views itself as the prototyp-
ical eastern money center. Despite this irony, it is clear that Massachu-
setts has recently undertaken rigorous "fair and equitable" merit 
review as well as very restrictive interpretations of cheap stock, option 
38. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 305(a)(E) (West Supp. 1983). 
39. Empirical Research Project, supra note 36, at 809. 
40. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(E), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1958), reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 5536 (1980). 
41. Id § 306(a)(e) comment. 
42. L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 84-85 (1976). The 
commentary, however, notes that § 306(a)(F) of the Uniform Act, by calling for 
substantive inquiry into unreasonable promoter's profits, addresses one area in 
which the blue sky laws have traditionally applied a merit as opposed to a disclo-
sure standard. Id at 85-86. 
43. See Bartell, Merit Regulation and Clearing Strategy, printed in STATE REGULA-
TION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 315, 317-18 (D. 
Goldwasser & H. Makens, eds. 1983). For an analysis of the meaning of the 
"work a fraud" language in the Maryland Securities Act, see Sargent, State Lim-
ited and Private Offering Exemptions: The Maryland Experience in a National Per-
spective, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 496,513-14 n.98 (1984). 
44. For an analysis of the historical origins of merit regulation, see Bateman, State 
Securities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma and a Suggestion lor the Federal 
Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.l. 759, 776-79 (1973); see also L. Loss & E. COWETT, 
BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 ( 1958) (discussing history of merit regulation). 
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and warrant, escrow, underwriting expense, and offering price.45 This 
type of review of public offerings, including offerings of well financed 
companies underwritten by established firms, has created an astonish-
ing pattern of public offerings that cleared with little difficulty in most 
states but were delayed or denied effectiveness within the common-
wealth. There have been some recent indications of a possible easing 
of the literal application of existing regulations and a retreat from a 
subjective review of the risks involved in a particular offering. The Di-
vision's continued commitment to a rigid form of consumer protection 
regulation indicates, however, that until it issues new regulations, Mas-
sachusetts merit regulation of public offerings will remain difficult and 
unpredictable.46 
C Current Proposals 
In the fall of 1982, the Secretary of State established four commit-
tees47 to assist the Division in revising the regulations to produce a 
clearer articulation of the standards used to review both public and 
private offerings. Although these committees had met on numerous oc-
casions by the end of 1983, no proposed regulations have emanated 
from this process. It is likely, however, that significant changes in the 
regulations, as well as the issuance of additional interpretive releases, 
will soon be forthcoming. 
The committee charged with considering regulation of non-tax-
advantaged public offerings has addressed two principal concerns: the 
definition of insider stock, and the terms for escrow of insider stock. 
The Division's identification of insider stock has been an ad hoc pro-
cess, and negotiated on a different basis each time the matter presents 
itself. It is possible that Massachusetts may adopt part of the NASAA 
45. See Empirical Research Project, supra note 36, at 804-08. 
46. During 1982 and the first half of 1983, the statistical experience of public registra-
tions and filed § 402(b)(9) exemptions in the commonwealth indicates that during 
1982, consistent with practices during the approximately preceding two years, a 
significant percentage of filings were withdrawn. Conversely, the statistical expe-
rience for the first six months df 1983 indicates that a palpably higher percentage 
of filings are becoming effective. 
Filed Withdrawn 
Filed Withdrawn 6 months 6 months 
Type of Filing 1982 1982 1983 1983 
Registration by 
Coordination or 
by Qualification 1,954 129 1,513 67 
§ 402(b)(9) 
Exemption 809 139 670 42 
The practice of the Division is to suggest withdrawal in advance of taking formal 
action, so the "withdrawn" category is a catchall both for those transactions that 
were abandoned and those that were contested by the Division. 
47. The committees consist of approximately 35 practitioners and participants in the 
securities industry. 
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guidelines concerning cheap stock.48 Although the NASAA guidelines 
represent a rigorous technique of insider stock regulation, they provide 
a precise definition of cheap stock.49 The possibility that the guidelines 
may be adopted may be increased by the 1983 induction of Division 
Director Michael Unger to the Presidency of NASAA. 
The committee's discussion revealed similar uncertainties about 
the future of insider stock escrows. Although the committee discussed 
one to five year escrows and an apparent consensus developed on the 
general imposition of a three year escrow with releases from escrow 
based upon earnings or market price, it reached no specific conclusions. 
Perhaps a disagreement over the purpose of insider stock escrows is at 
the basis of the indecision. Although some believe that escrow provi-
sions should protect public shareholders from the market impact of 
blocks of unescrowed shares, the Division seems preoccupied with "un-
just enrichment" of promoters holding insider stock. 
Similarly, the reasons for placing venture capital shares in escrow 
is not entirely clear. Whatever the reasons may be for requiring the 
escrow of shares issued to original promoters who are associated with 
the early formation of an enterprise, the mandatory escrow of shares 
sold in true venture capital offerings prior to the public issuance seems 
highly questionable. Although drawing the line between promoter 
stock on the one hand and venture capital stock on the other may be 
difficult in a particular case, reasonable guidelines are possible. 
Whether these committee discussions will result in the fine-tuning 
of the existing scheme under the insider stock regulations,50 or in a 
comprehensive revision of the current regulations, is uncertain. The 
numerical triggers contained in the current regulations, such as the per-
centage of insider stock permitted to be outstanding after different 
kinds of offerings, the ratio of price of prior sales of stock to the offer-
ing price, and the multiple of earnings reflected in the pricing of public 
offerings,51 appear to be based upon arbitrary figures. The liberaliza-
tion of these standards awaits the development of a regulatory logic as 
opposed to the substitution of newer and more liberal, but equally arbi-
trary, numerical standards. Indeed, the retention by insiders of a very 
high percentage of stock in a strong first-time registrant is viewed by 
some Massachusetts committee members as a desirable hallmark of the 
quality of an offering. The current regulations, however, reflect a pol-
icy decision that public offerings are acceptable only when the insiders' 
retained participation is of a decidedly lesser percentage. 52 
48. NASAA Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 
~~ 5312-5314 (Aug. 1984). 
49. Id. ~ 5312. 
50. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982). 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
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In spite of the current committee discussions, the Division has con-
tinued to apply very rigorous escrow standards to pending offerings. 
These standards have included the imposition of liquidating prefer-
ences for publicly issued shares and proposals of five year escrow 
terms. The Division has resisted attempts to correlate the release of 
shares from escrow with the safe harbors set forth in the regulations, 53 
even though presumably falling within those safe harbors might have 
avoided the necessity of escrowing shares in the first instance. 
Discussions concerning the public offering of tax advantaged pro-
grams have focused primarily upon the Division's application of the 
NASAA guidelines for real estate tax shelters and for oil and gas pro-
grams. 54 The relevance of these guidelines to Massachusetts practice is 
a matter of significant debate by practitioners who view Massachusetts 
as a disclosure jurisdiction, because the guidelines are premised upon a 
broad merit review standard. It is unfortunately clear, however, that 
issues of unreasonable compensation to promoters will be left to signifi-
cant merit review before the Division will grant effectiveness. 
D. A Regulatory Perspective 
Unless the Massachusetts Act55 is amended, the commonwealth 
will move toward a middle ground that balances the Division's convic-
tion that "fair and equitable" merit review is both justified under the 
current statute and essential for consumer protection, and the historical 
perspective of most practitioners that Massachusetts is, both as a matter 
of law and policy, primarily a disclosure jurisdiction. The importance 
of resolving this tension by the generation of a comprehensive, predict-
able, and clear set of regulations cannot be overemphasized. Many of-
ferings that are routinely cleared in other jurisdictions are not filed in 
Massachusetts because of the rigidity and unpredictability of the ex-
isting regulatory regime. The commonwealth's role as a capital center 
and its continued viability as one of the nation's centers of high techno-
logical enterprises require prompt resolution of these important regula-
tory issues. While most observers do not question the good intentions 
of the Division in protecting the public, there is a perception that the 
Division lacks the time and expertise to identify an offering that is so 
speculative as to "work a fraud." The "I know one when I see one" 
mentality56 must and presumably will be replaced with the predictabil-
ity that a well defined regulatory scheme can impart. Only such a 
53. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(E)(ii) (1978), reprinted in lA 
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982). 
54. NASAA Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs, 1 BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~~ 5352-5360 (June 1984); NASAA Statement of Policy for Registra-
tion of Oil and Gas Programs, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 5221-5232 (June 
1984). 
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. llOA, §§ 101-417 (West Supp. 1983). 
56. q: Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (describ-
ing test to determine whether matter is obscene). 
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scheme can strike a proper balance between the merit review and the 
disclosure approaches. 
IV. PRIVATE PLACEMENT OF SECURITIES IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
A. The Regulatory Context 
The Massachusetts Act contains several secuntIes and transac-
tional exemptions from registration also found in the Uniform Act.57 
The discussion that follows, however, focuses exclusively upon the ex-
emption in section 402(b )(9) of the Massachusetts Act58 and the current 
proposals for the redefinition of that exemption. The relation of the 
current exemption and the various proposals to NASAA's proposed 
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE)59 will also be discussed. 
Section 402(b)(9) provides an exemption from registration60 for 
the following transactions: 
[A]ny transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the offeror 
to not more than twenty five persons other than [institutional 
purchasers] in the commonwealth during any period of twelve 
consecutive months, whether or not the offeror or any of the 
offerees is then present in the commonwealth, if (A) the seller 
reasonably believes that all the buyers in the commonwealth 
[other than institutional purchasers] are purchasing for invest-
ment, and (B) insofar as an offer involves the payment di-
rectly or indirectly of any commission or other remuneration 
for solicitin~ any prosrective buyer in the commonwealth 
[other than mstitutlOna purchasers] a notice is filed with the 
secretary at least five full business days before the offer, and 
the secretary does not by order disallow the exemption within 
the next five full business days; but, in any event, the secretary 
may by rule or order, as to any security or transaction, or any 
type of security or transaction, withdraw or further condition 
thIS exemption, or increase or decrease the number of offerees 
permitted, or waive the conditions in clauses (A) and (B) with 
or without the substitution of a limitation or remuneration.61 
The Massachusetts Act substantially altered the exemption con-
tained in the Uniform Act by increasing the number of offers within the 
commonwealth (to other than institutional purchasers) from ten to 
twenty-five, and by eliminating the Uniform Act's absolute prohibition 
57. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402, 7A U.L.A. 631-42 (1958), reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 
~ 5542 (Jan. 1982). 
58. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11OA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983). 
59. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) 
(1983), reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982). 
60. The registration provisions appear at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11OA, §§ 301, 
403 (West Supp. 1983). 
61. Id. § 402(b)(9). 
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of payments of any commission for solicitation.62 
Most practitioners, when the Massachusetts Act was adopted, pre-
sumed that the section 402(b )(9) exemption would operate in much the 
same manner as the private placement exemption under prior law. 
Section 402(b)(9) was not regarded as embodying any particular con-
cern with payment of indirect commissions or other remuneration for 
solicitation beyond the requirement of a notice filing. Furthermore, 
practitioners viewed the exemption as self-executing, provided the Sec-
retary did not affirmatively disallow the exemption within the five days 
following the filing of the notice.63 
Nonetheless, commentators have noted that regulatory develop-
ments have substantially eroded the section 402(b)(9) exemption, and 
have turned the exemption into something of a registration process.64 
Despite the clear language of the statute, the Division has consistently 
maintained that it is entitled to apply merit review standards over a 
broad range of matters whenever a notice is filed under section 
402(b)(9). The first issue of the Massachusetts Securities Bulletin ex-
plained the Division's rationale: 
[B]ecause the language of Section 402(b)(9) must be read and 
interpreted within the context of the antifraud provisions, its 
exemption is not self-executing, i.e., simply a notice filing and 
the passing of the requisite five business days does not auto-
matically bestow exemption status upon the offering. 
Therefore, the granting of a 402(b)(9) exemption requires 
an active response from die Division: a thorough, intensive 
review of every offering conducted within the statutory time 
limit defined under the Section.65 
In conjunction with this announcement of the Division's intention to 
apply substantive merit review to exempt offerings filed under section 
402(b)(9), the Division announced that it would no longer follow the 
previous practice of liberally granting an expansion of the number of 
offerees within a twelve month period from twenty-five to some greater 
number, typically less than fifty.66 
Given the professed intention of the Division to provide merit re-
view to offerings involving underwriter compensation, it is necessary to 
determine the existence of underwriter compensation triggering the sec-
62. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IIOA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983) with 
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 641 (1958), reprinted in 1 BLUE SKY L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 5542 (Jan. 1982). 
63. Herwitz & Pokross, Massachusetts Securities Act, 1972 ANNUAL SURV. MASS. LAW 
521,528 (1972); see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 
1983). 
64. SMITH & CAVITCH, supra note 18, at 14-27. 
65. MASS. SEC. DIV., 1 MASS. SEC. BULL. No.1, at 15 (July 1980). 
66. fd. at 10. 
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tion 402(b)(9) filing requirement, and the scope of merit review to be 
applied if a filing is made. 
1. Indirect Remuneration 
Section 402(b)(9) requires a notice to be filed if either direct or 
indirect remuneration is paid.67 The Massachusetts Act does not, how-
ever, define "indirect remuneration." The Division takes an extremely 
broad view of what constitutes indirect remuneration for the purposes 
of section 402(b )(9). Although the statute calls for a filing only if an 
offering involves payment directly or indirectly of any commission or 
other remuneration 'jor soliciting" any prospective purchaser in the 
commonwealth,68 the Division has construed the provision much more 
broadly.69 A recent policy statement issued by the Division's General 
Counsel indicates that it is the Division's view that "any form of pay-
ment received by a seller, sponsor, promoter, or principal of any offer-
ing will be considered to be 'indirect remuneration', thereby obliging 
the offeror to file a notice in accordance with Section 402(b )(9), absent 
a showing of extraordinary circumstances. "70 The General Counsel 
reasoned that because the filing requirement was designed to enable the 
Division to evaluate the adequacy of disclosure concerning the invest-
ment program and to determine the reasonableness of the seller's and 
promoter's compensation, the words "indirect remuneration" must be 
interpreted broadly.7l On that basis, the Division stated that indirect 
remuneration included (1) any profit on the sale or lease of any serv-
ices; (2) any management, consulting or other fees charged at above 
customary rates; and (3) any payment made to any person connected 
with an offering that is based upon a percentage of the funds to be 
raised.72 
The effect of the General Counsel's position, applied literally, 
would be to expand the number of situations in which indirect remu-
neration is involved, thus triggering the section 402(b )(9) filing and 
merit review process. For example, the payment of a salary to the prin-
cipal of a corporate issuer, following completion of the offering, and 
the repayment of a loan out of the proceeds to an insider would both 
constitute indirect remuneration subject to section 402(b)(9) merit re-
view. In addition, the General Counsel's construction would character-
ize as indirect remuneration the payment to an affiliate of an issuer for 
the transfer of property or technology to the issuer, even at fair market 
value. Further, and perhaps most importantly given the intensity with 
which the Division focuses on tax advantaged offerings, the General 
67. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983). 
68. ld (emphasis supplied). 
69. MASS. SEC. DIV., 2 MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 9 (Nov. 1981). 
70.ld at 8. 
71. ld at 9. 
72.ld 
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Counsel's interpretation of indirect remuneration would include certain 
payments to a general partner of a tax shelter partnership. Specifically, 
the following payments would be included: a rent-up fee upon the 
rental of real estate, a fee in exchange for the guaranteeing of debt or 
the completion of a project, a management or consulting fee, the reten-
tion of a wrap mortgage on the transfer of real property to the program, 
and the retention of an interest in the value of capital transactions that 
the Division considers disproportionate to the cash investment of the 
general partner, even when this interest arises only after recovery of all 
of the participants' investment. 
Because the Division's position requires filing of a section 
402(b)(9) notice with respect to most, if not all, private placements 
within the commonwealth, the General Counsel's interpretation has 
been the subject of intense and continuing debate within 
Massachusetts. 
Several factors indicate that the Division's position is not justified 
under the Massachusetts statute. First, such an all inclusive interpreta-
tion is not justified by the language of section 402(b )(9). Had the legis-
lature intended a virtually universal filing it would have so stated in 
clear language. 
Second, although the Uniform Act differs from the Massachusetts 
Act in that the former absolutely prohibits sales remuneration, the offi-
cial commentary to the Uniform Act on this topic is instructive. The 
official comment to section 402(b)(9) of the Uniform Act indicates that 
the drafter did not intend to preclude all solicitation by directors, of-
ficers, or employees of the issuer. Solicitation is permissible: 
so long as it is only an incidental function of their regular 
duties and they receive no additional compensation. It is also 
relevant whether persons are specially hired in connection 
with the offering, particularly if they have a background in 
the securities busmess either as professional promoters or 
otherwise.73 
This official commentary suggests that benefits accruing to affiliates of 
the issuer, in contrast to payments directly related to a professional so-
licitation effort, are not intended to be included in the ambit of the 
phrase "commission or other remuneration [given directly or indi-
rectly] for soliciting any prospective buyer."74 
Third, an analysis of the three cases cited by the General Counsel 
as authority for his interpretation of the broad scope of "indirect remu-
neration" does not support his conclusion. To support the Division's 
73. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9) comment, 7A U.L.A. 641 (1958), reprinted in 1 BLUE 
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5542 (Jan. 1982). 
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis sup-
plied); see UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9) comment, 7A U.L.A. 641 (1958), reprinted 
in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5542 (Jan. 1982). 
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interpretation, the General Counsel relied upon Schultz v. Rector-Phil-
lips-Morse, Inc.,75 Petroleum Resource Development Corp. v. State,76 
and Upton v. Trinidad Petroleum Corp. 77 A brief review of these cases 
gives some insight into the willingness of the Division to extend the 
Massachusetts practice to, and perhaps beyond, its statutorily justifi-
able limits. 
In Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc.,78 the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas held that an initial consultation fee given to a promoter was 
indirect remuneration. The promoter, Rector-Phillips-Morse (RPM), 
sold ten percent interests in an apartment complex venture for $23,500 
each. After receiving $235,000 and before the actual construction of 
the complex, RPM paid itself a $28,000 "consultation fee." No expla-
nation was given as to what services were compensated by this fee. In 
addition, each investor was to pay RPM an annual consultation fee of 
$100, and a separate trustee was to manage the apartment complex for 
$1200 per month.79 The limited offering exemption provided by the 
Arkansas statute80 contained the Uniform Act's absolute prohibition on 
remuneration.81 Even though RPM disclosed its consultation fee to po-
tential investors,82 the Schultz court concluded that the initial consulta-
tion fee was remuneration for the solicitation and sale of the interests to 
the investors.83 In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed that 
RPM's fee for consulting services was derived from the "proceeds of 
the joint venture units sold to the investors" and was paid when liquid 
assets first became available.84 Apparently, the court viewed this ar-
rangement as the equivalent of the payment of a sales commission to 
RPM, thus making the exemption from registration unavailable. 
Petroleum Resource Development Corp. v. State 85 involved the of-
fering of fractional interests in oil and gas leases, with Petroleum Re-
source Development Corporation (PRDC) as the promoter. Originally, 
PRDC used commissioned salesmen in its promotion. The Oklahoma 
Securities Commission (Oklahoma Commission) requested that PRDC 
discontinue this practice because PRDC had not registered the securi-
ties with the Oklahoma Commission and the payment of commissions 
to the salesmen would make the statutory limited offering exemption 
75. 261 Ark. 769, 552 S.W.2d 4 (1977). 
76. 585 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1978). 
77. 652 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1981). 
78. 261 Ark. 769, 552 S.W.2d 4 (1977). 
79. Id. at 774-75, 552 S.W.2d at 6-7. 
80. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1248(b)(9) (Supp. 1975) (current version at id. (1980)). 
81. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 641 (1958), reprinted in I BLUE SKY L. 
REp. (CCH) ~ 5542 (Jan. 1982). 
82. RPM disclosed a consultation fee of $48,000 when it actually received only 
$28,000. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 784,552 S.W.2d at 12. 
83. Id. at 785, 552 S.W.2d at 12. 
84. Id. at 784, 552 S.W.2d at 12. 
85. 585 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1978). 
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unavailable to PRDC.86 PRDC amended its offering to provide that 
the company would drill, and "if appropriate" would complete and 
equip the wells from the sales revenues. The cost for drilling the well 
was estimated at $28,280 and the cost of completing and equipping the 
well was estimated at $47,158. PRDC projected that the revenues 
would be $63,404.22 to drill the well and $68,496.95 to complete and 
equip the well. Any costs in excess of the estimated amounts to be 
raised from investors were to be paid by PRDC, but PRDC was al-
lowed to retain any surplus remaining from the drilling revenues after 
the well was drilled and any surplus remaining from the completing 
and equipping revenues after the well was finished. In addition, PRDC 
retained a 23.5% working interest, although it contributed no capita1.87 
PRDC then applied for a prospective exemption under the limited of-
fering provision. The Oklahoma Commission denied the application 
because the "proceeds retained by [PRDC] in excess of the direct and 
indirect costs allocated to the exploration project are in fact, a form of 
indirect remuneration for the solicitation of sales within the meaning of 
[the Oklahoma exemption]."88 PRDC subsequently sued, seeking a re-
versal of the Oklahoma Commission's decision and a confirmation of 
its right to sell the interests without registering the offering. The 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected PRDC's argument that the indi-
rect remuneration limitation on the exemption was meant only to pro-
hibit the use of paid professional salesmen.89 The Petroleum Resource 
court stressed that PRDC could not circumvent the statute merely by 
calling the surplus a "supervisory fee" because the Oklahoma legisla-
ture "specifically included indirect remuneration in the limitation, 
wisely forseeing a possibility, such as present here, that a company 
might attempt to circumvent the limitation."90 The possible retention 
by PRDC of any surplus in the sales proceeds, the court concluded, 
constituted indirect remuneration for the solicitation of buyers within 
the meaning of the exemption.91 
Petroleum Resource has been criticized for suggesting that any sum 
received by a promoter not directly attributable to costs of the venture, 
such as legitimate management or supervisory fees, might be consid-
ered indirect remuneration and thereby defeat the use of the exemp-
tion.92 The decision provides no guidance for distinguishing between 
these payments and remuneration for solicitation. 
The third decision relied upon by the Division, Upton v. Trinidad 
86. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15) (West Supp. 1983). 
87. Petroleum Resource, 585 P.2d at 347. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 348. 
90. Id. (emphasis supplied). 
91. Id. 
92. Note, Securities Regulation: Hidden Danger of Indirect Remuneration and the Lim-
ited Offering Exception in Oklahoma, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 924, 929 (1979). 
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Petroleum Corp. ,93 involved the promotion of interests in an oil and gas 
operation by Charles Beard, the sole shareholder in Trinidad, the is-
suer. Beard was also the sole shareholder of Beard & Associates, which 
owned a seventy-five percent interest in the lease on the land where the 
well subject to the offering was located. Beard & Associates sold the 
lease interest to Trinidad for a $3,500 profit. Trinidad then signed a 
"turnkey" contract with a drilling company for drilling the well, result-
ing in total project expense to Trinidad of about $81,500. Trinidad, 
while retaining a twenty-five percent interest, collected $147,000 from 
the investors, each of whom had a contract that specified that his 
money was to be applied to drilling costs only. After the well proved to 
be dry, Trinidad did not refund any of the excess money; rather, it used 
the surplus for normal operating expenses.94 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found 
two possible sources from which Beard and Trinidad could have re-
ceived "indirect remuneration," thereby preventing Trinidad's offer-
ings from qualifying for the Alabama limited offer exemption: (1) 
Beard's $3,500 profit on the sale of the leasehold interests to Trinidad; 
and (2) the funds that Beard and Trinidad collected that greatly ex-
ceeded the actual costs of drilling the well.95 
With respect to the latter, Trinidad contended that the amount, 
which totaled over $65,000, was "the type of profit to which any busi-
ness corporation is entitled."96 The Upton court disagreed, stating that 
"the money retained by Trinidad was not a profit in the ordinary sense 
in that it was not derived from the operation of the business. It flowed 
directly from the investors to Trinidad as a consequence of Beard's ef-
forts to solicit purchasers of interests in [the well]."97 
Trinidad also argued that the excess was not remuneration but was 
a "reserve for contingency." The Upton court suggested that this re-
serve could be maintained and not constitute remuneration if it bore a 
"logical relation to the actual risks involved," which would have been 
over one million dollars if a major "blow-out" had occurred.98 The 
court also noted that any such reserve should contain "some mecha-
nism for returning the excess to the investors on a pro rata basis in 
cases where, as here, the contemplated contingencies do not material-
ize."99 Trinidad, as offeror, did not return the excess, using it to cover 
not only the drilling costs of the well, but also the overhead expenses of 
its entire corporate operation. 100 
In evaluating the importance of these cases, it should be noted that 
93. 652 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1981). 
94. Id. at 425-26. 
95. Id. at 426. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 427. 
99. Id. 
100.1d. 
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all of the three cited cases are from jurisdictions other than Massachu-
setts and not from major securities law courts. Each of the three cases 
involves a tax shelter program and, perhaps by current standards, an 
abusive tax shelter program. 101 In addition, all of these cases represent 
examples of extreme fact patterns from which general rules should not 
be derived. These examples of promoter profiteering cannot support 
the General Counsel's apparent position that virtually every section 
402(b)(9) transaction contains indirect remuneration requiring merit 
review. Finally, the Division's construction of the "indirect remunera-
tion" provisions is not in accord with the understanding of the Massa-
chusetts securities bar at the time of the adoption of the Massachusetts 
Act that the section 402(b )(9) exemption would not be restrictively ap-
plied. Most practitioners are thus of the view that neither the Massa-
chusetts statute nor the authorities cited by the General Counsel justify 
the broad scope given to the phrase "indirect remuneration" by the 
Division. 102 
2. Scope of Review of Section 402(b )(9) Offerings 
As explained above, the Division undertakes a merit review of pri-
vate placement offerings for which filings must be made under section 
402(b)(9).103 This review is as comprehensive as the Division's review 
of registered public offerings. The basis for this review can be found in 
the regulations and in an informal policy statement issued by the 
Division. 
Under the Massachusetts regulations, the section 402(b)(9) notice 
must contain "[i]nformation from which the Director can determine the 
commission or other remuneration which will be paid."I04 After the 
Division determines the amount and nature of the commission or other 
remuneration, it evaluates the payment in terms of the standards ap-
plied to the payment of remuneration in registered public offerings. 105 
The Division has expressed the policy that: 
[t]he standards of Section 305 of the Act [allowing the issu-
ance of stop orders] 106 apply to all offerings made in Massa-
101. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6719-24 (1984) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 10) (Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) abusive tax shelter regulations). Although the position of 
the Division is that indirect remuneration arises in its most pernicious form in tax 
shelters, the Division's stated position is that indirect remuneration issues also are 
presented in corporate offerings. 
102. But see Prince v. Heritage Oil Co., 109 Mich. App. 189,311 N.W.2d 741 (1981) 
(retention by sellers ofleasehold interests in gas and oil wells without contributing 
proportionate share of capital to the venture was "remuneration" within Michi-
gan's version of the Uniform Act). 
103. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text. 
104. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(b)(1l)(F) (1978),reprintedin lA BLUE SKY 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,472 (Sept. 1984). 
105. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305 (1978), reprinted in lA BLUE SKY L. 
REp. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982) (governing registered public offerings). 
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11OA, § 305 (West Supp. 1983). 
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chusetts, whether registered or exempt. The primary concern 
of the Division is protection of public investors with respect to 
all securities offerings, and especially with regard to nighly 
speculative and start-up ventures. 107 
No current issue in Massachusetts securities practice is more hotly 
contested as the scope of review permitted the Division in section 
402(b )(9) offerings. The Division imports on a wholesale basis the reg-
ulatory scheme for public offerings,108 which consists of several com-
plex rules governing insider stock, price-earnings ratios, the price of an 
offering, underwriter compensation, and remuneration of sellers, and 
other issues. In addition, the Division will occasionally review a pri-
vate placement offering on a "fair and equitable" standard and .will 
either enter a stop order lO9 to prevent the effectiveness of the section 
402(b)(9) exemption, or will advise counsel of the desirability of with-
drawing the filing lest a stop order be instituted. Although most mem-
bers of the Massachusetts securities bar are of the view that section 
402(b)(9) permits a far narrower review than does section 305, llO the 
Division has continued to engage in comprehensive merit review of 
section 402(b )(9) offerings. 
The Division's merit review of section 402(b)(9) offerings is not 
justified. Section 402(b)(9) requires a filing only when the transaction 
involves the payment of commissions and other remuneration for the 
solicitation of prospective purchasers. III If the Division is to undertake 
any merit inquiry, it would seem logical that it should be restricted to 
the issue of remuneration, and only with the remuneration that arises 
in connection with the solicitation of investors. Given the language of 
section 402(b )(9),112 it is virtually incomprehensible that the section 
should be construed to justify a broad merit review inquiry. There ap-
pears to be no statutory basis for applying all of the insider stock regu-
lations, 113 issued under section 305,114 to the review of section 402(b )(9) 
offerings; section 305 relates to registered offerings that work or tend to 
work a fraud upon purchasers. It cannot even be said that the section 
305 regulation governing compensation of underwriters and promot-
ers 115 applies to a section 402(b )(9) exempt offering. The section 305 
standard includes consideration of promoters' profits and participa-
107. MASS. SEC. DIV., I MASS. SEC. BULL. No. I, at 16 (July 1980) (footnote added). 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 11-45 (describing regulation of registered 
offerings). . 
109. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 305 (West Supp. 1983) (authorizing Divi-
sion to issue stop orders). 
110. Compare id. § 402 (private offerings) with id. § 305 (public offerings). 
Ill. Id. § 402(b)(9); see supra text at note 61. 
112. See supra text at note 61. 
113. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305 (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982). 
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 305(a)(E) (West Supp. 1983). 
115. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305(a)(2)(F) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982). 
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tions, neither of which is the proper subject matter for inquiry under 
section 402(b )(9), which speaks only of sales remuneration and not pro-
moter's profits or participation. 
B. Current Private Placement Practices: Merit Review of Exempt 
Offerings 
Current use of the section 402(b )(9) exemption must be analyzed 
from the different vantage points of the corporate offering and the tax 
shelter offering. The Division has stated that it actually receives few 
section 402(b )(9) notices for corporate issuances of shares of stock or 
debt and that it encounters few, if any, abuses or frauds in this area. 
This observation seems to make only two conclusions possible: either 
both thieves and poor businessmen are irresistably attracted to tax shel-
ter programs and never to corporate investments, or the level of legal 
practice within the commonwealth varies radically. Experience sug-
gests that the latter conclusion is correct. It is likely that some practi-
tioners simply do not file section 402(b )(9) notices if a corporate 
offering is not formally underwritten. Some practitioners representing 
small and unsophisticated corporate issuers may conclude from a cur-
sory examination of section 402(b )(9) and the regulations 116 that a fil-
ing is not necessary because no underwriter or broker-dealer is 
involved in the transaction. A direct placement of stock to a few inves-
tors without the participation of a broker-dealer, an underwriter, or a 
finder ll7 might well strike the practitioner as falling outside of the filing 
requirements. At the other extreme, the experienced practitioner may 
well reject the Division's claims to the contrary and conclude that sec-
tion 402(b )(9) in fact does not require a notice even if an affiliate of the 
corporate issuer will receive a salary, or will convey property to the 
issuer in exchange for part of the proceeds of an offering, or will have 
his loan repaid from the proceeds. 
Indeed, it may be that many practitioners remain unaware of the 
Division's position that any payments to attorneys or accountants by 
the promoter or offeror in connection with the evaluation of a private 
placement constitutes indirect remuneration within section 402(b )(9). lIB 
This position is especially questionable when a sophisticated group of 
ventuJ;e capitalists purchases the stock of a corporate issuer and the 
116. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(b)(9) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. 
REp. (CCH) ~ 31,472 (Sept. 1984). 
117. A finder is a "person who, for consideration, participates in the offer to sell, sale, 
or purchase of securities or commodities by locating, introducing, or referring po-
tential purchasers or sellers." Michigan Uniform Securities Act, MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. § 451.802(u) (Supp. 1982). Michigan is the only state that formally 
distinguishes the finding function from the brokerage function. See Hampton, 
Broker Dealers, in MICHIGAN SECURITIES REGULATION, A BLUE SKY LAW COM-
PENDIUM 65, 88-89 (1983) (c. Moscow & H. Makens, eds.). 
118. See MASS. SEC. DIV., 2 MASS. SEC. BULL. No.2, at 8-9 (Nov. 1981); see supra 
notes 67-72. 
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corporate issuer pays the fees of the attorney representing the investor 
group. This type of arrangement does not present the opportunity for 
abuse that the notice procedure under section 402(b )(9) was designed to 
prevent. 
The greatest current activity in section 402(b )(9) filing arises in 
connection with tax sheltered programs. The intensity may result in 
part from the vitality of today's tax shelter market and in part from the 
sophistication of counsel to these types of offerings. No easy general-
ization can be made concerning the current treatment of these 
programs. 
As a starting point, an issuer must understand that each program is 
likely to be subject to merit review in great detail. The Division has, in 
the private placement context, directly I 19 or indirectly l20 barred the of-
fering of tax advantaged programs involving promoters with discipli-
nary records, highly speculative programs, programs that might be 
deemed under current Internal Revenue Service regulations to be abu-
sive tax shelters,121 programs that are not supported by sufficient legal 
opinions, and programs presenting "excessive" direct and indirect re-
muneration as the Division defines those phrases. It is not unusual, in 
a section 402(b )(9) filing of a tax shelter program, for counsel to engage 
in intensive negotiation with the Division concerning the method of 
calculating the amount of indirect remuneration involved. The Divi-
sion will tend to include any compensation paid to a finder or broker-
age house, any remuneration paid by the offeror to offeree attorneys, 
accountants, or other representatives, and many forms of consideration 
received by general partners or their affiliates. Examples of this type of 
consideration are expense reimbursements to the general partner, pay-
ments of fees to general partners for past or future services, any appro-
priation by the promoters of proceeds remaining after required 
expenses are covered, and equity positions held or retained by general 
partners or affiliates that are disproportionate to their capital 
investment. 
Another example is the retention of residuary interest by general 
partners or affiliates after the sale and refinancing or other capital 
transaction involving the subject property. The Division will treat 
these retained interests as remuneration even if they only arise after the 
other investors have recovered their investment. Also included are 
markups in price or any profit incidental to the use of wrap mortgages 
in conjunction with the transfer of property from the general partner or 
119. The Division may directly bar the offering by issuing a cease and desist order, 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 407A (West Supp. 1983), or by seeking an 
injunction, id § 408. 
120. The Division often suggests that an offering be withdrawn before taking formal 
action. See supra note 46. 
121. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6719-24 (1984) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 10); supra note 
101. 
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his affiliates to the program, and any other present or future payments 
to the general partner or his affiliates. The negotiation of the value of 
these payments to the general partner, and their relation to the eighteen 
percent maximum imported from the public offering regulations, 122 
sometimes involves more ad hoc negotiation than the application of 
identifiable standards. 123 
C Current Proposals 
As in the public offering area, the Secretary of State has designated 
two committees to work with the Division in revising the regulations 
governing the private placement of securities. These committees have 
addressed both corporate offerings and tax advantaged offerings, and 
have focused their attention on the operation of section 402(b )(9) and 
the possible addition of a Massachusetts version of the ULOE. 124 
Without tracing in detail the tortuous path of these discussions be-
tween the Division and the private sector, it now appears that after 
NASAA's adoption of a final ULOE at its September 1983 meeting, 125 
the Division will push for the adoption of something akin to that 
ULOE provision within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. To ad-
vance the policy of national uniformity, that provision should closely 
follow the NASAA text. Discussions with the Division concerning the 
ULOE, however, have revealed its unfortunate enthusiasm for innova-
tion, despite the national thrust toward uniformity. Consequently, 
there seems to be a great risk that any Massachusetts provision will 
alter the ULOE. 
A careful study of the debates over the ULOE discloses in clear 
terms the tension in the search for an appropriate regulatory fulcrum; 
the debate between disclosure review and merit review has continued. 
The Division is struggling with the fact that, basically, the ULOE 
makes applicable to the states the federal exemptive scheme embodied 
in Regulation D of the General Rules and Regulations of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (Regulation D),126 which is a disclosure ap-
proach to securities issuances. 
Regulation D approaches issuances in tiers based upon the size of 
an offering. Offerings at or below five hundred thousand dollars are 
not regulated by federal law. 127 Offerings at or below five million dol-
lars are limited to thirty-five purchasers plus an unlimited number of 
institutional or "accredited" (wealthy) investors, wherein nonac-
122. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.305 (a)(2)(F) (1978), reprinted in IA BLUE 
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,465 (Aug. 1982). 
123. For a statistical summary of the recent private placement experience, see supra 
note 46. 
124. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) 
(1983) (reproduced at I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982)). 
125. Id. 
126. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .506 (1983). 
127. Rule 504 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (1983). 
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credited investors receive disclosure comparable to that required by 
SEC Form S-18. J28 Regulation D also provides that for offerings over 
five million dollars, nonaccredited investors must also meet sophistica-
tion standards, and a higher level of disclosure, as provided in SEC 
Form S-l, is required for these investors. 129 
The threshold ULOE issue to be considered by the Division is 
whether ULOE replaces, or only supplements, the section 402(b)(9) ex-
emption. The most recent position of the Division is that ULOE 
should replace at least section 402(b)(9)(B),130 which applies in in-
stances where a commission or indirect remuneration is paid so that 
filing a five day letter is required. This conclusion is indeed unfortu-
nate. In many cases, a commission is paid, or a participant receives 
something that the Division would consider to be indirect remunera-
tion under its broad definitions, and yet the transaction will not, for 
example, comply with the federal disclosure requirement for offerings 
at or below five million dollars. 131 An offering to a modest number of 
nonaccredited persons, friendly to the offeror or introduced by a finder, 
might well not involve written disclosure complying with S-18 stan-
dards, and yet would be exempt under the Securities Act of 1933.132 A 
similar exemption should be available under Massachusetts law, and 
indeed is available today. The addition of the ULOE should not elimi-
nate that Massachusetts exemption, because in fact numerous legiti-
mate private placements, involving commissions, cannot support the 
cost or effort of a SEC Form S-18 disclosure document. 
The Division's response is that the continuation of section 
402(b)(9) would create a "loophole," because ULOE is unavailable to 
persons who, generally, are subject to orders or rulings involving 
fraud,133 but no such prohibition applies to section 402(b )(9) offerings. 
Although the issue presented could be remedied both today and under 
ULOE by making section 402(b)(9)(B) unavailable to certain undesir-
able persons, the Division's position is illustrative of its perception that 
any exemption presents an opportunity to perpetuate fraud by avoiding 
merit review. 
The Division, at least to date, has been willing to include larger 
offerings that comply with the federal provisions 134 into the Massachu-
setts ULOE, thus adopting the more liberal option of the ULOE official 
draft. Although a conservative approach to the rest of ULOE mitigates 
much of the progress this inclusion promises, the election to exempt 
128. Rule 505 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1983). 
129. Rule 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1983). 
130. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 402(b)(9)(B) (West Supp. 1983). 
131. Rule 505 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1983). 
132. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1982). 
133. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) 
(1983) (reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982)). 
134. Specifically, it has indicated a willingness to include Rule 505 and Rule 506 offer-
ings in the Massachusetts ULOE. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505, .506 (1983). 
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transactions over five million dollars that comply with federal law 135 is 
a clear acknowledgement by the Division of the realities of raising cap-
ital in today's environment. 
The Division presently proposes to adopt footnote one of the 
ULOE, which discusses the increased risk of fraud in tax shelter offer-
ings and requires, for direct participation offerings only, the prepara-
tion of a written disclosure document for individuals who are 
"accredited" under Regulation D.136 The Massachusetts Securities Bar 
(Bar) has objected, suggesting that the footnote's gratuitous discussion 
concerning the risks of shelters is inappropriate for inclusion in govern-
mental regulations, and has suggested that a possible compromise 
might be to limit the disclosure obligation to tax shelter deals only, 
rather than to all direct-participation transactions. 
Indeed, the Division's lack of faith in the SEC's approach to dis-
closure review is carried further by the Division's refusal to permit the 
Massachusetts ULOE automatically to reflect the nature of the Regula-
tion D exemption. The Division claims that, because that exemption 
may be amended by the SEC in the future, this agreement would con-
stitute an abrogation of the Division's responsibility, even if the com-
monwealth were to retain an express right to reject any particular 
Regulation D amendment by specific action. 
Rule IA of ULOE 137 permits fees in connection with the offering 
to be paid only to persons who are "appropriately registered" under 
state law. The Massachusetts version proposes to add an exemption for 
a general partner who, without a broker, sells not more than one pro-
gram each year. In light of this additional exemption, Massachusetts 
proposes to eliminate the provisions of the ULOE that provide for a 
simplified broker registration for persons who become brokers only by 
reason of the offering of new issues while not conducting a general bro-
kerage business. The Bar has urged a reversal of the Division's posi-
tion to permit a limited registration, noting that otherwise the 
Massachusetts statute requires a fully registered broker to be registered 
with the SEC. 138 Even the most prudent of general partners is unlikely 
to undertake this obligation. The Division claims that a full registra-
tion is required for investor protection, but suggests the issuance of an 
interpretive release stating that a bona fide general partner is not a bro-
ker-dealer, requiring any registration, because he is not in the business 
135. Rule 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1983). 
136. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) 
note 1 (1983) (reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 
1982». Footnote one of the ULOE states that a written disclosure document 
must be provided to accredited persons who, by reason of their status, would 
otherwise not necessarily receive a formal document. Id. 
137. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) rule 
lA (1983) (reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982». 
138. For the SEC broker registration provisions, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.501 to .510 
(1983). 
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of brokerage. This release would be welcomed by the Bar, although it 
is analytically inconsistent with the provision of an express exemption 
for a general partner selling a single program each year, since that gen-
eral partner theoretically will be exempt by the definitional release. 
The Division proposes, with general assent of the Bar, to adopt 
rule IB of ULOE,139 making the exemption unavailable to so-called 
"bad boys," who are persons involved in an offering who have had 
recent involvement in fraud, suspension or other disciplinary action in 
the securities, or similar fields. Similarly, there is little resistance to the 
adoption of rule ID of ULOE, 140 which adds to Regulation D a suita-
bility requirement to individual nonaccredited investors, which can be 
met generally either by financial status or investor knowledgeability. 
Perhaps the two most hotly contested areas are those of a numeri-
cal limit on the number of permitted investors in a ULOE exempt 
transaction, and the nature and timing of the filing to be made with the 
Division. Regulation D permits an unlimited number of accredited 
purchasers, plus thirty-five purchasers nationally. 141 The Division pro-
poses an absolute maximum of thirty-five purchasers within Massachu-
setts, both accredited and nonaccredited. Although this proposal 
represents some progress conceptually from the current limit of twenty-
five o/.fers, 142 it is inconsistent with national ULOE uniformity and ap-
pears to be an arbitrary mathematical limitation without any functional 
rationality. 
The question of timing of filings highlights the Division's resist-
ance to surrendering its ability to conduct substantive review. ULOE 
contains options for filings prior to sale, or afterwards. 143 Under Reg-
ulation D, the SEC filing generally is due after the sale. l44 The Divi-
sion has proposed a filing, in all cases, ten days before the sale. 145 
Further, the Division seeks filing of all offering materials. This 
requirement is inconsistent with the Division's expressed positions that 
it does not want to conduct merit review under ULOE, that it does not 
require any review of corporate offerings because of an historical ab-
sence of abuse in corporate private placements, and that it does not 
have sufficient staff to process any more paperwork. In addition, the 
Secretary's committee expected that some mechanism probably would 
be provided for post-sale filing, without inclusion of offering materials, 
139. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) rule 
IB (1983) (reproduced in I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982». 
140. Id rule lD. 
141. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), -.506(b)(2)(i) (1983); see id § 230.-
508(e)(I)(iv). 
142. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 402(b)(9) (West Supp. 1983). 
143. UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) 
note 4 (1983) (reproduced in I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982». 
144. Rule 503 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a)(I), (3) (1983). 
145. Under the Division's proposal, it would add a clarification that the holding of 
funds in escrow is not the equivalent of a sale. 
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at least for corporate offerings and perhaps for all except tax shelters. 146 
There is indeed the possibility that the Massachusetts ULOE will 
not be available for tax-shelter offerings that fall within certain IRS 
standards of abusiveness 147 or for which there exists no supporting au-
thority for the availability of the posited tax benefits. Presumably, this 
program could be filed under section 402(b)(9) if that statutory exemp-
tion remains unaltered. The nature of the review to be given an offer-
ing under section 402(b )(9), which fails to meet standards for even a 
pre-filing review under a ULOE procedure, should not make the spon-
sor of the program optimistic about prospects for clearance. 
The Division's decision to seek pre-sale filing for all types of offer-
ings, with offering materials, represents a retreat in concept that has left 
the Secretary's committee unclear as to whether the Division is serious 
about its promised reorientation of regulatory thinking. If a ULOE 
that is to contribute to regulatory uniformity, and that is to constitute a 
departure from merit review, the resolution of this issue is perhaps the 
litmus test. The Division's view that uniformity justifies requiringpre-
filing in all cases is not persuasive. The Division's assertion that pre-
filing will facilitate a "substantive" review that is somehow less than a 
"fairness" or "merit" review remains an encouraging but untested reg-
ulatory promise. 
The Division will soon formally issue its new private offering regu-
lations, affecting among other things both section 402(b )(9) offerings 
and ULOE. There will follow an opportunity for discussion and testi-
mony. Given the philosophical ambivalence of the Division, only the 
conclusion of that process will disclose the shape of Massachusetts reg-
ulation. A regulatory fulcrum, either disclosure or substantive review, 
must soon be selected in Massachusetts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts securities regulation presently is in a state of flux. 
Beginning with a statute that is, in essence, the Uniform Act, the Divi-
sion by enforcing the statute and issuing regulations has expanded the 
statute so that current practice is often indistinguishable from open-
ended "fair and equitable" merit review. 
Although recent developments, including the operation of several 
appointed committees and general pronouncements by the Division of 
an intention to reform its practices, at least outside of the abusive tax 
146. It has always been clear, if not desirable, that tax shelter offerings would be sub-
ject to pre-sale filing together with the offering materials. Some Massachusetts 
practitioners believe that at least these offerings will be given merit review in spite 
of the prohibition of such review by footnote 5 of the ULOE. See UNIFORM LIM-
ITED OFFERING EXEMPTION (N. AMER. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, INC.) note 5 (1983) 
(reproduced in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Oct. 1982». 
147. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6719-24 (1984) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 10) (IRS abusive 
tax shelter regulations). 
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shelter area, must be taken as constructive indications for the future, 
nonetheless current Massachusetts practice is slow and unpredictable 
and suffers from an inability fairly to identify the degree to which merit 
review will be applied to both public and private offerings. 
Unless and until the Division, the practicing Bar, and the securi-
ties industry reach some sort of an accommodation so that a compre-
hensive and predictable set of regulations can be issued, Massachusetts 
will continue in its current and unenviable position as an enigma to the 
uninitiated, and as a frustration even to those who practice in the com-
monwealth. This reevaluation of policy will perhaps result not only in 
clear regulation, but also regulation that is reasonably uniform with the 
rest of the country. 
ADDENDUM 
As this issue went to press, the Division amended section 
14.402(b)(13) of title 950 of the Massachusetts Administrative Code to 
provide a "Massachusetts Uniform Limited Offering Exemption" 
(MULOE) for use in connection with offerings under Rules 505 and 
506 of Regulation D. The amended rule became effective September 
14, 1984. MULOE is a significantly broader exemption than that avail-
able under section 402(b)(9) of the Massachusetts Securities Act, and as 
such represents a positive recognition of the kinds of problems dis-
cussed in this article. This new rule, however, imposes certain exemp-
tive conditions additional to or different from those already imposed by 
Regulation D. It is anticipated, furthermore, that some kinds of 
MULOE transactions will be subjected to a still unspecified degree of 
substantive review by the Division staff, despite their exempt status. In 
addition, offerings exempted from federal registration by means other 
than Rules 505 or 506 will remain subject to pre-commencement notice 
filing and substantive review under section 402(b )(9), which remains in 
effect. The private placement of securities in Massachusetts, therefore, 
will continue to generate questions of policy and practice similar to 
those discussed in this article. 
The adoption of MULOE, furthermore, does not address the prob-
lem of defining the role of merit regulation in Massachusetts, except 
insofar as it will allow a somewhat greater number of transactions to 
proceed on an exempt basis without merit review. MULOE thus repre-
sents some progress, but Massachusetts remains in search of a regula-
tory fulcrum. 
